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no grandparents or same-sex partners demanding shared custody.2
No frozen embryos, eugenic sperm banks, or surrogate mothers awaiting judicial deliberation. But most conveniently, King Solomon did
not labor under fierce cries of "due process!" or "equal protection!"
Such sentiments, part of a growing clamor for parental and adult
rights, provide much of the confusion and contradiction in family law
3
jurisprudence today.
Family law litigants have long searched for permutations of constitutional principles that gain access to federal courts and vindicate
supposed constitutional rights in state family law cases. 4 In the process, even the venerable "best interests of the child" standard has been
compromised, a standard under which judges can weigh competing
claims in child-related cases by weighing the child's interests most
heavily.5 Such cases pitting children's interests against those of adults
have been resolved relatively easily by federal courts in the United
States to date, but more complicated cases may ensue if the introduction of family law cases to federal dockets continues accelerating. 6
One legal system currently wrestling with this familiar clash
between the rights of children and adults is that of England, which
shares the United States' deeply embedded commitment to the child's
changed her mind after having agreed, under a surrogacy contract, to be artificially
inseminated with a man's sperm and to surrender the baby to him and his wife).
2 The family unit in King Solomon's time is no longer typical. See, e.g., Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("The demographic changes of
the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family."); Developments in the Law-The Law of Marriageand Family, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1996, 2001 (2003)
[hereinafter Developments] ("The 'nuclear family'-still the archetype in American law
and politics-for the first time describes less than one-quarter of all U.S.
households.").
3 When speaking of adult rights, this Note refers to both parental and
nonparental rights regarding children.
4 See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth
Amendment." (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))).
5 For a useful background on the American best interests standard, seeJohn C.
Lore 111, ProtectingAbused, Neglected, and Abandoned Children: A Proposalfor Provisional
Out-of-State Kinship Placements Pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, 40 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 57, 64 n.23 (2006).
6 Thus far, the Supreme Court has carefully selected its family law cases. See, e.g.,
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) ("The intangible fibers that connect
parent and child have infinite variety. They are woven throughout the fabric of our
society, providing it with strength, beauty, and flexibility. It is self-evident that they
are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection in appropriatecases." (emphasis
added)).
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best interests. This common value has hardly slowed parents on
either side of the ocean from arguing that their rights should take
priority over the court-construed best interests of their children. In
England, the discord between the rights of parents and those of children has been aggravated by the recent passage of conflicting legislation-parents are now armed with the rights granted by the Human
Rights Act of 1998, 7 while children's interests are given preference in
an earlier act, the Children Act of 1989.8
England's strategy in dealing with this conflict has visible advantages and disadvantages, but more importantly, offers lessons to the
United States that are examined in this Note. Part I considers the
constitutional rights for American adults that implicate the best interests standard, particularly under due process and equal protection
arguments. Part II explores the same conflict between adults' rights
and children's best interests under recent English legislation incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights. Finally, Part III
exacts lessons for the United States from England's similarly positioned situation. It concludes that American federal courts should be
more hesitant to federalize family law as it relates to children if the
best interests standard is to be preserved and argues that the standard
is more effective in protecting children's interests than the
Constitution.
I.

THE ENCROACHMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ON
THE BEST INTERESTS STANDARD

The Federal Constitution not only fuels the federalization of family law, but also serves as a fertility statue for conflict between the best
interests standard and the rights potentially afforded to adults. The
occasional Supreme Court stints in state family law issues have raised
many eyebrows, 9 yet the Supreme Court defended its interference in
Lehr v. Robertson 0 :
In some cases, however, this Court has held that the Federal
Constitution supersedes state law and provides even greater protection for certain formal family relationships. In those cases, as in the
state cases, the Court has emphasized the paramount interest in the
7 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.).
8 Children Act, 1989, c. 41, § 1 (Eng.).
9 See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 337, 361-69 (2002); Eric S. Lind, Note, Interstate Collection of Child
Support and Federalism: Mhy the States Have Authority and What They Need to Do to Keep it,
11 BYUJ. PuB. L. 103, 108-09 (1997).
10 463 U.S. 248.
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dren because they create parental rights that are enforceable in federal court even if those rights conflict with the best interests of a child.
Procedural due process claims are more neutral to children's interests
because they simply allow courts to hear arguments from both parties
and decide the case under the best interests standard.
A recent example of a splendid clash between a parent's substantive due process rights and the best interests standard occurred in
Troxel v. Granville.18 The Washington statute disputed in Troxel read:
"'Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time
including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may
order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the
best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of
circumstances. "'19 Under the statute, a set of grandparents attempted
to obtain visitation rights with their grandchildren after the mother
curtailed visitation. Prior to the mother's interference, the grandparents were regularly visited by the children before their son-the
father of the children-committed suicide.2 0
The Superior Court found that visitation was in the children's
best interests, 2 1 while the Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds
that nonparents lacked standing to seek visitation under the statute
unless a custody action was pending. 22 The Washington Supreme
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in denying the grandparents' visitation rights, but on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional
because it interfered with the fundamental right of parents to rear
2
their children. 3
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981))), and Stanley, 405 U.S. at 660 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
("[T]he Court holds sua sponte that the Due Process Clause requires that Stanley, the
unwed biological father, be accorded a hearing as to his fitness as a parent before his
children are declared wards of the state court... ."), with Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("[Wle held that the 'liberty' protected by the Due
Process Clause includes the right of parents to 'establish a home and bring up children' and 'to control the education of their own.'" (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923))).

18 530 U.S. 57.
19 Id. at 93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting WAsH.
(1994)).

REV. CODE

§ 26.10.160(3)

20

Id. at 60.
Id. at 61; see also id. at 62 ("The court took into consideration all factors regarding the best interest of the children and considered all the testimony before it. The
21

children would be benefitted (sic] from spending quality time with the Petitioners,
provided that that time is balanced with time with the childrens' (sic] nuclear family."
(second alteration in original)).
22 In re Troxel, 940 P.2d 698, 701 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); see also In re Wolcott, 933
P.2d 1066, 1069 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
23 In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 27 (Wash. 1998).
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proven unfit.3 0 Any infringement upon this parental decision violates
due process. 3 ' In fact, Justice O'Connor concluded that Troxel was
simply about the conflict between the state and the parent in regards
to the child's best interests: "[T]his case involves nothing more than a
simple disagreement between the Washington Superior Court and
32
Granville concerning her children's best interests.
However, TroxeCs adverse impact on the child's best interests
standard is more pronounced than the plurality opinion admits, catalyzing dissenting opinions from several Justices. First, the presumption that fit parents always act in their children's best interests can
hardly characterize all litigating parents, particularly in tense divorce
proceedings that pit the father against the mother. Second, the Washington statute simply granted a third party the procedural right to
seek visitation with a child, allowing the court to weigh the circumstances under the best interests of the child standard.3 3 Nonetheless,
it was stricken, prohibiting courts from using the standard in permitting third parties to visit children over parental objections, even when
it was in the children's best interests. Most importantly, by finding the
statute unconstitutional, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the
34
best interests standard in third-party visitation cases.
30 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68; see supra note 13.
31 Justice O'Connor also suggested that the mother did not want to wholly restrict
the grandparents' visitation: "Finally, we note that there is no allegation that Granville
ever sought to cut off visitation entirely. Rather, the present dispute originated when
Granville informed the Troxels that she would prefer to restrict their visitation with
Isabelle and Natalie to one short visit per month and special holidays." Troxel, 530
U.S. at 71. Although this may be factually true in Granville's case, it is not difficult to
imagine that giving a mother complete discretion in regards to third party visitation
rights may result in the complete termination of those visitation rights.
32 Id. at 72.
33 See id. at 90-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Far from guaranteeing that parents'
interests will be trammeled in the sweep of cases arising under the statute, the Washington law merely gives an individual-with whom a child may have an established
relationship-the procedural right to ask the State to act as arbiter, through the
entirely well-known best-interests standard, between the parents' protected interests
and the child's.").
34 By finding the statute unconstitutional, Troxel undermined the best interests
standard in all fifty states. See id. at 99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, contemporary practice should give us some pause before rejecting the best interests of the child
standard in all third-party visitation cases, as the Washington court has done. The
standard has been recognized for many years as a basic tool of domestic relations law
in visitation proceedings. Since 1965, all 50 States have enacted a third-party visitation statute of some sort.... Each of these statutes, save one, permits a court order to
issue in certain cases if visitation is found to be in the best interests of the child.").
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Thus, although much scholarly attention regarding Troxel has
focused on the denial of grandparents' rights, this case also prioritized
the mother's due process rights over the best interests of her child in
the context of third-party visitation. 5 The result caused Justice Scalia
concern regarding the federalization of family law:
I think it obvious . . that we will be ushering in a new regime of
judicially prescribed, and federally prescribed, family law. I have no
reason to believe that federal judges will be better at this than state
legislatures; and state legislatures have the great advantages of
doing harm in a more circumscribed area, of being able to correct
their mistakes in a flash, and of being removable by the people.3 6
Justice Souter also cautioned in his concurrence that Troxel did not
necessitate "turning any fresh furrows in the 'treacherous field' of sub57
stantive due process.
Although due process has thus interfered with the child's best
interests standard, the equal protection clause has also tipped several
family law cases onto the Supreme Court's docket, to which this Note
turns next.
B. Equal Protection Claims
Equal protection is another popular constitutional claim used by
family law litigants in federal courts. Although winning a family law
case on an equal protection argument may be difficult, 38 success is not
35 States rebelled against this decision. See infra notes 124-28 and accompanying
text.
36 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 76 (SouterJ., concurring) (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
502 (1977)); see also Moore, 431 U.S. at 544 (WhiteJ, dissenting) ("That the Court has
ample precedent for the creation of new constitutional rights should not lead it to
repeat the process at will.").
38 The Supreme Court has allowed the rights among family members to differ,
but only if such distinctions "serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 388 (1979) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). Compare id.
at 391 (holding that equal protection was violated by the New York Domestic Relations Law provision that allowed an unmarried mother, but not an unmarried father,
to block her child's adoption because the sex-based discrimination advanced no
important state interest), with Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983) ("If
one parent has an established custodial relationship with the child and the other
parent has either abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection
Clause does not prevent a state from according the two parents different legal
rights."), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 665 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
("The Illinois Supreme Court correctly held that the State may constitutionally distinguish between unwed fathers and unwed mothers. Here, Illinois' different treatment
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rare enough to discourage litigators from invoking it. The Equal Protection Clause, for example, was successfully used to override a lower
39
court's determination of a child's best interests in Palmore v. Sidoti,
wherein the Supreme Court prioritized the Fourteenth Amendment
40
and society's interest in not tolerating racism.
In Palmore, the lower court determined that keeping a three-yearold in the custody of her Caucasian mother, who had cohabitated with
an African American before marrying him, was not in the child's best
interests. 4 1 The court therefore granted the child's biological father
full custody, placing part of its judgment on the cohabitation factor:
It is of some significance, however, that the mother did see fit to
bring a man into her home and carry on a sexual relationship with
him without being married to him. Such action tended to place
gratification of her
own desires ahead of her concern for the child's
42
future welfare.
of the two is part of that State's statutory scheme for protecting the welfare of illegitimate children.").
English courts determine parentage and the legal rights afforded to parents by
virtue of the definitions embodied in certain legislation. When denying fatherhood
to a woman's ex-partner, although during their relationship she was implanted with
an embryo composed of another man's sperm so that they could raise a child within
the relationship together, the Appeal Court explained, "We agree that the term 'parent' includes a person who is to be treated as a parent by virtue of section 27 or 28 of
the [Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990." In re R (A Child) (IVF: Paternity of Child), [2003] EWCA (Civ) 182, [2003] Fain. 129, [31]. However, the court
was quick to mention the Children Act of 1989, "Of course, findings of parentage can
be made in the course of other proceedings, for example under section 4 of the
Children Act 1989." Id. at [33]. In this particular case, however, the court conceded
that the best interests of the resulting daughter may require visitation from the expartner despite his lack of parental legal status. A court order is pending while the
former couple attempts to come to a voluntary agreement regarding visitation. Id. at
[35].
39 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
40 Id. at 433. But see Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254-55 (1978) (holding
that the adoption of a child by the stepfather according to the best interest of the
child standard did not violate the biological father's due process rights, when he
made no effort to legitimize the child). For an examination of the issue of race and
adoption in English law, see Michael Freeman, Disputing Children, in CROSS CURRENTS,
supra note 12, at 441, 467-68.
41 Palmore, 466 U.S. at 431.
42 Id. English courts also use a mother's sexual gratification as evidence that she
does not prioritize a child's best interests. See, e.g., In re KD.(A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access), [1988] A.C. 806, 814 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) ("[The
mother] was, however, very immature and there were a number of occasions upon
which she allowed her interest in going out and meeting boyfriends to take priority
over the interests of her child. She formed an association with a rather unsatisfactory
young man and in June 1983 became pregnant again.").
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, returning
the child to the full custody of the mother and stepfather, over the
biological father's objections. Admitting that child custody cases raise
state issues, the Court emphasized the best interests standard, "The
goal of granting custody based on the best interests of the child is
indisputably a substantial government interest for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause." 43 Ultimately, however, the Court held that
the lower court's judgment regarding the best interests of the child
catered to private prejudices and interfered with the Equal Protection
Clause. 44 By doing so, the Court prioritized the principle of equal
protection over the lower court's determination of the best interests
of the child, noting that the child may suffer negative consequences as
a result.
Although Palmorerests on particularly sensitive facts that dramatically invoke an equal protection claim, 45 the constitutional argument
makes less controversial but equally successful appearances in cases
involving the changing roles and rights of men and women in family
law today. 46 Thus, the rise of both equal protection and due process
arguments has provocatively challenged the place of the best interests
standard in American family law.
II.

THE

CLASH BETWEEN ADULTS' AND CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS IN ENGLAND

The same conflict between adults' rights and children's best
interests surfaced most recently-and most powerfully-across the
pond in England. The problem has continued to intensify there and
teeters on irreconcilability unless the English courts can reach a satisfactory resolution. Given that this conflict is immortalized in contradictory English legislation, a solution is hardly simple.

43 Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
44 Id.
45 The presence of race in Palmore has not affected the precedential value of the
case, which has been invoked by several subsequent litigants. See, e.g., Marlow v. Marlow, 702 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ind.Ct. App. 1998). Unsurprisingly, however, state courts
have declined invitations by litigants to expand Palmore's scope, instead prioritizing
the best interests standard. See, e.g., Phelps v. Phelps, 446 S.E.2d 17, 22 (N.C. 1994);
Jones v.Jones, 542 N.W.2d 119, 123 (S.D. 1996).

46

See supra note 38.
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The Statutory Basis for Conflict

The Children Act of 198947

1.

Although English law regarding children is steeped in common
law, 48 this Note will focus on children's rights following the legislative
recognition of such rights in the Children Act of 1989. The 1989 Act
has been held to be "the most comprehensive piece of legislation
which Parliament has ever enacted about children." 49 The Act
reformed substantive law, procedures, the duties of government agencies, the responsibilities of parents, and the structure and authority of
the courts that deal with children. 50
The subject of this Note, and the equivalent of the American best
interests standard, is the welfare principle embedded in section 1 of
the Children Act of 1989: "When a court determines any question
with respect to (a) the upbringing of a child; or (b) the administration of a child's property or the application of any income arising
from it, the child's welfare shall be the court's paramount consideration." 5 1 Section 1 also provides several other general principles for
courts to use in child-related cases:
[1.] the courts shall have regard to the general principle that any
delay in determining questions with respect to the child's upbringing is likely to prejudice the child's welfare;
[2.] the courts shall have regard to certain specific matters when
applying the welfare principle in contested 'family proceedings'
(defined by § 8(3) of the Act); and
[3.] the court shall not make an order unless doing so would be
52
better for the child than making no order at all.
While the welfare principle is not unique to this Act, 53 the legislation
underscores the significance of the welfare principle in English family
47
48

Children Act, 1989, c. 41 (Eng.).
For a history of the welfare principle in England since feudal times, see KERRY
O'HALLORAN, THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD 9-35 (1999). Previous legislation on children did exist as well, namely, the Children Act of 1948 and Children Act of 1975. It
is worth noting that the Children Act of 1989 formulated a more modem, updated
view of the family. Whereas historically, English law and policy viewed the family as a
two-parent household headed by the father, the Children Act of 1989 made no such
assumptions.
49 Donald N. Duquette, Child Protection Legal Process: Comparing the United States
and Great Britain, 54 U. PITr. L. REv. 239, 245 (1992).
50 Id.
51 Children Act, 1989, c. 41, § 1(1) (Eng.).
52 Id. § 1(2)-(5).
53 See supra note 48.
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law: The children's best interest is paramount in a court's decision,
54
even at the expense of other family members' rights.
The child's welfare is defined neither by this legislation nor by
any other. The Act's novel contribution to family law, however,
derives mostly from its introduction of a checklist of factors that
guides courts to respect the paramountcy of a child's best interest.
These include a child's needs and wishes. 5- Any result of the welfare
inquiry should benefit the child the most.
The welfare principle of the Children Act of 1989 therefore
reflected common law, in addition to providing formal guidelines for
courts in their efforts to protect the children's best interests. The Act
has been a major influence on family law judges, remaining the
56
golden rule for child-related cases to date.
2.

-7
The Human Rights Act of 1998 5

There are two major sources of rights for English adults: domestic
common law and European law. Domestic common law overwhelm54 Opining on the welfare principle, the House of Lords repeated Lord
MacDermott's sentiment, " [ the welfare principle allows] a process whereby, when all
the relevant facts, relationships, claims and wishes of parents, risks, choices and other
circumstances are taken into account and weighed the course to be followed will be
that which is most in the interests of the child's welfare as that term has now to be
understood. That is the first consideration because it is of first importance and the
paramount consideration because it rules upon or determines the course to be followed." In re K.D. (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access), [1988] A.C. 806, 821
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
55 The exact checklist is as follows:
a. the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered
in the light of his age and understanding);
b. his physical, emotional and educational needs;
c. the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances;
d. his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court
considers relevant;
e. any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering;
f. how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to
whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his
needs;
g. the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in question.
Children Act, 1989, c. 41, § 1(3) (Eng.).
56 See, e.g., Stephen Gilmore, Contact/SharedResidence and Child Well-Being: Research
Evidence and Its Implications for Legal Decision-Making,20 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 344,
345 (2006) (noting that the British Government concluded that no change was
needed to the fundamental principles in the Children Act of 1989).
57 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K).
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parental rights, buttressed
ingly prioritizes the welfare principle over
law, on the other hand, more
by the Children Act of 1989. European
those created by the
seriously considers parents' rights, particularly
58
Human Rights.
European Convention on

neither European law nor
English courts often have opined that
of law because of Parliamentary
European conventions have the force
legislation to take precesovereignty, which allows England's domestic
law created by other boddence over any national or international
had ratified the European
ies.5 9 Thus, although the United Kingdom
unenforceable by the English
Convention on Human Rights, it was
it into
Rights Act of 1998 incorporated
courts until the Human
wronged
60 Prior to 1998, any Englishman
English domestic law.
of
bring his case to the European Court
under the Convention had to 61
Human Rights in Strasbourg.
human rights home
The Human Rights Act of 1998, in bringing
courts, has been touted as
by facilitating their enforceability in English
near equivalent of the United
a milestone in English law and the
62
the Human Rights Act provided
States Constitution. At a minimum,
containing "a compreEngland with a written, enforceable document
63
rights."
hensive statement of individual, fundamental
into the legal system, howThe introduction of such legislation
traditional role. One court
ever, confused the English judiciary's
of the European Conwrote, "It is now plain that the incorporation will subject the entire
law
vention on Human Rights into our domestic
and, where necessary,
review
of
process
legal system to a fundamental
64 However, courts have exhibited noticeable
reform by the judiciary."
Convention on Human
hesitancy in integrating the European
Freedoms
of Human Rights and Fundamental
58 Convention for the Protection
Human
on
Convention
[hereinafter European
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
Rights].
Testing), [2000) Fain. 48, 61.
59 See, e.g., In re C. (A Child) (H.I.V.
(U.K.).
60 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42
61
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65 See, e.g., David Bonner et al.,
met with
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Act
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& COMP. L.Q. 549, 572 (2003) (arguing
suspicion from English judges).
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66 See generally In re K.D. (A Minor)
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31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 738 (2001).
70 L. v. Finland, App. No. 25651/94,
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question, requiring accessibility and foreseeability to prevent a govern71
ment's arbitrary interference.
The aims enumerated in Article 8(2) include national security,
public safety, the economic health of the country, the prevention of
disorder or crime, the protection of health and morals, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The European court
may classify children as "others" for the purpose of this clause, which
allows it to pay some attention to a child's rights in the process of
2
weighing the adults' rights.7

Finally, the expression "necessary in a democratic society"
requires that the interference "corresponds to a pressing social need
and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued; in determining whether an interference is 'necessary in a democratic society,' the Court will take into account that a margin of
73
appreciation is left to the Contracting States."
Significantly, the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the fundamental right of Article 8 to be access of a family
member to children, opining, "the mutual enjoyment by parent and
child, as well as by grandparent and child, of each other's company
constitutes a fundamental element of family life, and domestic measures hindering such enjoyment amount to an interference with the
74
right protected by Article 8 of the Convention."
In sum, Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights and the
attendant European case law create equal rights to privacy for both
children and adults. These equal rights to privacy of all family members directly conflict with the Children Act of 1989.75 This is particu-

larly true under the interpretation of Article 8 by the European Court
of Human Rights. 76 With the advent of the Human Rights Act of
71 Id.
72 See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
73 Olsson v. Sweden, 130 Eur. Ct. H.R. 7, 32 (1989); see also W. v. United Kingdom, 121 Eur. Ct. H.R. 8, 27 (1988) (noting that governments have some discretion
in deciding which measures are "necessary in a democratic society").
74 L. v Finland,31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 757-58; see, e.g., Andersson v. Sweden, 226
Eur. Ct. H.R. 6 (1992); W. v. United Kingdom, 121 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 27. But cf.Troxel v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000) (plurality opinion) (denying grandparents' access to
the child); A v. C, [1985] 6 Faro. L.R. 445, 451 (arguing that access to a child is an
opportunity, not a right).
75 See Shazia Choudhry & Helen Fenwick, Taking the Rights of Parents and Children
Seriously: Confronting the Welfare Principle Under the Human Rights Act, 25 OxroRD J.
LEGAL STUD. 453, 457 (1998).

76 See id. at 454 ("(T]he (European] Court [of Human Rights] affords weight to
the Article 8 fights of parents to respect for family life so that in the case of a clash of
rights those of the child will not invariably win out and therefore the inception of the
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1998, all of this law became integrated into English domestic lawlaying the foundation for conflict between the rights of children and
those of adults.
3.

The Ensuing Conflict Between Adults' and Children's Rights

The clash between the interests of English adults and children
therefore results from the distinct but conflicting rights endowed by
the Children Act of 1989 and the Human Rights Act of 1998. Between
these two acts, the most significant source of tension is the amount of
77
weight each places on the best interests of the child.
In endowing equal rights to all family members, the Convention
on Human Rights treats children as legal equivalents of adults. Thus,
if a court wanted to prioritize the child's interests, it can only do so by
including the child as an exception to the parent's rights under Article 8(2), which allows governmental interference in the family "for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."7 The child, in
other words, needs to become the "other" to have his rights and freedoms protected. This exception is the only means for the European
Court to align its judgments with England's welfare principle.7 9 However, although identifying a child as an "other" fulfills the "legitimate
aim" prong, the interference must also be both in accordance with the
law and necessary in a democratic society. The European Court easily
and often finds a violation of one of these three prongs, enabling it to
rule in favor of a parent despite the best interests of her child. And
hence, European family law inherently conflicts with English family
law, which is complicated by the English courts' insistence on the welfare principle.8

°

Human Rights Act has called the current [English] domestic approach into
question.").
77 See id. at 457 ("Article 8 [of the European Convention on Human Rights], in
encapsulating the fights of both parents and children to private and family life,
appears on its face to come into clear conflict with the [Children Act of 1989], which
renders the child's interests paramount.").
78 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 58, art. 8.
79 CompareYousefv. Netherlands, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 249, 262 ("[]n judicial
decisions where the rights under Art. 8 of parents and those of a child are at stake, the
child's rights must be the paramount consideration. If any balancing of interests is
necessary, the interests of the child must prevail."), with Choudhry & Fenwick, supra

note 75, at 467 (noting that English courts rely on a narrow subset of European jurisprudence to find in favor of children's best interests, neglecting the remainder of

European case law).
80

SeeA v. C, (1985] 6 Faro. L.R. 445, 450 ("In some cases it is said there has been

talk of access [to a child] as being the

...

right way of approaching the question. I
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In Johansen v. Norway,8 l for example, a mentally and physically ill
mother who entered abusive relationships with men challenged the
placement of her second child into foster care with a view toward
adoption.8 2 She argued that her Article 8 rights were violated,
prompting the European Court of Human Rights to apply the three
prong test. The Court was able to satisfy itself that the Norwegian
government's interference with the mother's Article 8 rights was legiti83
mate because it intended to safeguard the development of the child.
Furthermore, the Court agreed that the interference was in accordance with domestic law.8 4 However, the Court imposed strict legal
scrutiny on permanent restrictions on a parent's right of access to her
child. Permanent deprivation of an adult's rights to a child can only
be necessary under Article 8(2) if there are compelling reasons and
exceptional circumstances.8 5 According to the Court, the mother's
track record of significant instability, not to mention the problems she
encountered in raising her first child with the help of welfare authorities, were not enough to deprive her of permanent access to her child
under Article 8.86
The result in Johansenis nearly inconceivable in the English legal
system, which would prioritize the welfare of the child over a parent's
right of access to the child. If a mother exhibited the same amount of
instability and incompetence in an English court, she would be unable
to access her child because the welfare principle opposes such
87
parenting.
English law prioritizes children's rights through both a strict
adherence to the welfare principle and separate legislation. Legislathink the right way of approaching it is that the child's interests are paramount and
the court must do what it thinks is in the interests of the child.").
81 (No. 13), 1996-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 983.
82 . Id. at 991-96.
83 Id. at 1003.
84 Id. at 1002.
85 Id. at 1008.
86 Id. at 1007-10. It was only the second expert called in the case, at the mother's
request, that had any hope for the mother's ability to raise her child. The first expert
expressed a view in harmony with the stance of English courts, "It is of decisive importance for [the child's] personal development that she now gets the opportunity to
attach herself to persons whom she may regard during her adolescence as stable and
secure parents." Id. at 987. This expert's view was subsequently rejected by the
Human Rights Court. Id.
87 See, e.g., In re K.D. (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access), (1988] A.C. 806,
813-20 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that a mother's access to her child,

who was placed in foster care toward the view of permanent adoption, can be
restricted if in the best interests of the child).

2007]

ADULT

RIGHTS AS

THE ACHILLES'

HEEL

tively separating children's rights from those of adults favors children's interests in two ways. First, it allows a government to recognize
the priority of children's rights over conflicting adults' rights. Second, children's legislation serves as a tie breaker among the litigants:
Should a conflict arise between the rights of children and those of
adults, the court can invoke the paramountcy of the welfare principle.
It is a mistake, however, to conclude that the English courts have
been completely averse to adult interests. However, adult interests
were considered privileges instead of rights. As Shazia Fenwick and
Helen Choudhry explain, "In the pre-[Human Rights Act of 1998
era], then, it is clear that while the parents' interests were not
ignored, and might be viewed as privileges, they were not characterized as rights and the paramountcy principle was the determining factor."88 Furthermore, according to one scholar,8 9 courts were mindful
of adult interests much before the Human Rights Act of 1998, guarding them through various other means, such as loosely enforcing the
welfare principle, artificially aligning the interests of children and
their parents, 90 and outright denying jurisdiction to avoid messy family law issues. 91 Following the Human Rights Act, however, English
courts must consider adults' interests as rights instead of privilegesan uncomfortable proposition.
This means, of course, that English adults in child-related cases
can invoke certain protections under the Human Rights Act to
counter the welfare principle, giving rise to the present conflict. One
commentator succinctly paraphrased the resulting task for English
courts, "But in the light of the Human Rights Act and the centrality of
88 Choudhry & Fenwick, supranote 75, at 462; see also A v. C, [1985] 6 Fain. L.R.
445, 451 ("As I understand it, the law is that, prima facie, the parents shall have access
to his or her child and that that shall be unless there is very good reason to the
contrary. It is not a right, it is a privilege. It is always up to the judge to decide what is
the best interests of the child." (emphasis added)).
89 Jonathan Herring, The Human Rights Act and the Welfare Principle in Family
Law-Conflicting or Complementary?, in HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 133
(Frances Butler ed., 2000).
90 In re T. (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment), [1997] 1 W.L.R. 242. The
court decided not to force life-saving medical treatment on a child whose parents
resisted the treatment, reasoning, "this mother and this child are one for the purpose
of this unusual case and the decision of the court to consent to the operation jointly
affects the mother and son and it also affects the father." Id. at 251.
91 Re E (Residence: Imposition of Conditions), [1997] 2 Fain. L.R. 638, 643
(C.A.) (denying the court's jurisdiction in a case where a mother's relocation was
contested because she merely wanted to relocate within the U.K.). But cf Payne v.
Payne, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 166, [2001] Fain. 473, [2]-[26] (allowing a mother to
emigrate with her child from England to New Zealand over the objections of the
child's father, who lived in England).
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the welfare principle in the Children Act, the courts are going to be
forced to develop some kind of synthesis between the two approaches
92
if at all possible."
B. JudicialAttempts at Resolving the Conflict in England
Having been entrusted with the delicate task of integrating Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights with the welfare
principle, English judges have slowly begun adjudicating cases within
the new legal framework. The best way to classify the courts' reaction
to Article 8, however, is awkward resistance, particularly when it comes
93
to compromising the welfare principle.
The courts have not yet justified their continued departure from
the Convention that binds them. Despite attempting several reconciliations of Article 8 with the welfare principle, no clear resolution has
emerged. Instead, the courts have used several methods of entirely
avoiding the invariable problems posed to adults' Article 8 rights by
the welfare principle.
1. Denying the Existence of a Conflict
One strategy the English courts have adopted toward the conflict
is to deny its existence.9 4 To this end, the House of Lords has often
either narrowly interpreted the Convention so that it overlaps with
English law, or broadened its interpretation to the point that it speaks
of universal truths. 95 Either way, the conflict between Article 8 and
92 Herring, supra note 89, at 135.
93 See generally Choudhry & Fenwick, supra note 75, at 462-69 (arguing that
English courts have resisted the Human Rights Acts because courts are too attached
to the welfare principle as currently conceived-that children's welfare automatically
prevails over the rights of other family members).
94 Section 3 of the Human Rights Act of 1998 has imposed on English courts an
obligation to interpret any British legislation as compatible with Convention Rights,
or else declare an incompatibility so that legislators can remedy it. See Lady Justice
Arden, The Interpretationof UK Domestic Legislation in the Light of European Convention on
Human Rights Jurisprudence,25 STATUTE L. REv. 165, 166 (2004). However, there is a
significant difference between favorably viewing English legislation as compatible with
Article 8 and turning a blind eye to conflict in lieu of declaring an incompatibility. By
declaring an incompatibility, English courts would compel Parliament to remedy the
conflict between Article 8 and the welfare principle, perhaps by legislatively weakening the Children Act of 1989. Such a result is unacceptable to English judges who
have long prioritized the welfare principle over adults' rights. For the proposition
that English family law courts have been hostile to the Human Rights Act of 1998
from its beginning, see Bonner et al., supra note 65, at 572.
95 See, e.g., Re C (A Child) (Immunisation: Parental Rights), [2003] EWCA (Civ)
1148, [24], (771-[80] (focusing so narrowly on Article 8 that the case's discussion of
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the welfare principle artificially disappears because the differences
between them are wholly avoided.
Two judicial opinions in In re K.D.96 exemplify both the narrow
and broad interpretations of the Convention that English courts have
embraced in their efforts to minimize the conflict between Article 8
and the welfare principle. Although the case was heard well before
the Convention's integration into English law, it is significant because
the House of Lords tried to reconcile Article 8 with English common
law, mostly by denying the conflicts between the two legal systems.
Lord Templeman began his opinion by focusing on the subset of
principles from English common law and the Convention that overlapped, as well as rehearsing their similar histories. 9 7 He narrowed his
interpretation of each to the point that any conflict between the two
legal systems was circumvented:
My Lords, English common law and statute require that in all matters concerning the upbringing'of an infant the welfare of the child
shall be the first and paramount consideration.... The English rule
was evolved against an historical background of conflict between
parents over the upbringing of their children. The [European]
Convention [on Human Rights] rule was evolved against an historical background of claims by the state to control the private lives of
individuals. Since the last war interference by public authorities
with families for the protection of children has greatly increased in
this country. In my opinion there is no inconsistency of principle or
application between the English rule and the Convention rule. The
best person to bring up a child is the natural parent.95
From this narrow interpretation of Article 8, Lord Templeman
extracted the proposition that a biological parent is the best person to
raise a child. This is indeed true of English common law as well. 99
The problem, however, with using this singular similarity to reconcile
English common law with Article 8 is that it does not address the most
litigated issues where the welfare principle and Article 8 diverge. It is

practically inconceivable to imagine a jurisdiction that keeps children
away from their fit, biological parents. But, what happens if the parthe medical condition of tetanus is longer and more extensive than its analysis of
Article 8).
96 In re KD. (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access), (1988] A.C. 806 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.).
97 Id. at 811.
98 Id. at 811-12.
99 Section 1 of the Children Act of 1989 provides guiding principles for English
courts, one of which prevents them from entering an order unless doing so is better
for the child than not. Children Act, 1989, c. 41, § 1(5) (Eng.); see supra text accompanying note 52.
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ents are unfit? Furthermore, how should a court handle a case
wherein one parent wants to emigrate with a child over the objections
of the other parent? It is on these issues that Article 8 and English
common law diverge, creating conflicts that Lord Templeman
neglected by invoking a common but misrepresentative subset of the
two legal systems.
In the same case, another judge in the House of Lords, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton, also attempted to reconcile Article 8 with common
law, but by generalizing both legal systems to the point of discussing
universal truths. He opined:
Such conflict [between Article 8 and English law] as exists, is, I
think, semantic only and lies only in differing ways of giving expression to the single common concept that the natural bond and relationship between parent and child gives rise to universally
recognized norms which ought not to be gratuitously interfered
with and which, if interfered with at all, ought to be so only if the
welfare of the child dictates it.1°0
Although Lord Oliver's argument is similar to Lord Templeman's, he managed to broaden the interpretation of the Convention in order to reach a universal truth that is undeniable:
Governments should not interfere with universally recognized norms.
However, Lord Oliver proceeds further with his argument to suggest
that such interference may be legitimate if in the best interests of the
child. 10 1 Although this last argument perfectly suits English common
law and the Children Act of 1989, it ignores the equality of rights
granted to all family members by Article 8.
Even though both Lord Templeman and Lord Oliver proclaim
the similarities between European and English law in In re K.D., the
case probably would have been decided much differently by the European Court of Human Rights, illustrating the conflict between English
common law and Article 8. Because In re K.D. was decided prior to
the Human Rights Act, however, only the European Court of Human
Rights in Strasbourg could have vindicated the mother's Article 8
rights-an opportunity she failed to pursue.1 0 2 If the subsequent case
of Johansen is any indicator, though, the European Court would have
likely opposed the English court.1 0 3 The facts were similar in both
cases-centering on an incompetent mother whose access to her
100

In re K.D., [19983 A.C. at 825.

101

Id.

102 In re K.D. illustrates the reasoning behind the Human Rights Act of 1998poor litigants could not afford to take their case to Strasbourg, so their Convention
fights had to be enforceable in English courts so as to be truly protected.
103 SeeJohansen v. Norway, (No. 13), 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 983.
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would have been in the
child was threatened by adoption, which
Court of Human Rights
child's best interests. However, the European
mother's rights to her
prohibited any restrictions on the incompetent one reached by the
the contrary of the
child in Johansen, a result to
10 4
KD.
re
English court in In
of the interpretation of the
Both the narrowing and broadening
Article 8 and glosses over the
Convention thus misses the point of
details that create
details that conflict with English law-significant
each jurisdiction are decided.
the grounds on which cases in
cite, then, cannot be repreWhatever similarities the English courts
8 and the welfare principle,
sentative of a harmony between Article
issues.
which inherently diverge on central
Misapplying European Law
and the Children Act entitle
To deny that the Human Rights Act
is either to avoid the Convenchildren and adults to conflicting rights
the European Court's extensive
tion or to misunderstand it. Given
Article 8,105 the resulting implicaexplanations and interpretations of
deliberately avoiding the consetion is that the English courts are
on the welfare principle.
quences of the Convention
0 6 provides an example of the English courts'
Payne v. Payne
find in the best interests of the
reformulation of European law to
was allowed to permanently move
child. In Payne, a child's mother
England, despite the father's
with her child to New Zealand from
with their child would infringe his
argument that decreasing contact
that the relocation would make
10 7
Article 8 rights. The court reasoned
the welfare of her child.
increasing
thereby
happier,
the mother
the father's Article 8 claim
The English court in Payne dismissed
of the European Court of Human
by selectively quoting the decision
European Court shared England's
Rights in Johansen to argue that the
10
In Payne, the English
preoccupation with the welfare principle.
the jurisprudence of the EuroCourt of Appeals opined: "Accordingly
recognises the paramountcy
pean Court of Human Rights inevitably

2.

104 Id. at 1010.
notes 70-74.
105 See supra text accompanying
an excellent
(Civ) 166, [20011 Fain. 473. For
EWCA
[20011
Payne,
106 Payne v.
see Bonlaw,
of Paynes treatment of Convention
discussion regarding the sloppiness
ner et al., supra note 65, at 549.
matter of experi166 at [301 ("Logically and as a
107 Payne, [2001] EWCA (Civ)
from
and psychological security and stability
ence the child cannot draw emotional
psychologically
and
carer herself is emotionally
the dependency unless the primary
give what she herself lacks.").
cannot
stable and secure. The parent
But see supra Part II.A.2.
108 Id. at [39]; see infra note 112.
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of our domestic statnot expressed in the language the court held that:
albeit
principle,
ute."1 0 9 It concluded so because, "In Johansen,
to the best interests of the
'the court will attach particular importance
1 10 As one scholar
the parent."'
child, which... may override those of
of Johansen conveys an
underscored, however, the exact language will attach particular
he court
entirely, different sentiment: "'[T]
child, which, depending1on their
importance to the best interests of the
The
those of the parent."'""
nature and seriousness, may override
disJohansen
in
of a vital phrase
English court's intentional omission
the
Court, which only prioritizes
1 1 2 Othtorts the message of the European
circumstances.
best interests of a child in certain, undefined
right to family privacy is shared
erwise, according to Article 8, the
any priority given to children's
equally by children and adults, without
best interests.
an unwarranted distinction
Furthermore, the Payne court made
and traditional ones, a disbetween families fragmented by divorce
in the case law interpreting Article
tinction that simply does not exist
113 When it came to the traditional
8 of the European Convention.
law and European law were well
family, Payne suggested that English
the right to family life is a
aligned because "[i]n a united family
in
1 1 4 However, according to Payne, there was a void
shared right."
in regard to fragmented
European law that English law completed
the separating memfamily life, "But once a family unit disintegrates family life. Certainly
a fragmented
bers' separate rights can only be to
participation to the extent and in
to
the absent parent has the right
of the individual case dicwhat manner the complex circumstances
that the Convention did not
tate." ' 1 5 And thus, Payne concluded
should not alter its course, which
impact English domestic law and

at [381.
109 Payne, [20011 EWCA (Civ) 166
v. Norway, 1996-111 Eur. Ct.
(quotingJohansen
omitted)
(citations
110 Id. at [39]
H.R. at 1008).
Eur. Ct.
75, at 463 (quoting Johansen, 1996-111
111 Choudhry & Fenwick, supra note
261-62
249,
H.R.
Ct.
Eur.
Netherlands, 2002-VIII
H.R. at 1008). But see Yousef v.
approach).
balancing
the
in
heavily
more
(allowing a child's interest to weigh
European
by the English courts-that the
used
frequently
argument
The
112
subset
selective
very
a
on
standard-is based
of
Court similarly respects the best interests
consideration
serious
a
requires
nonetheless
of European jurisprudence, which
supra note 75, at 467.
adults' rights. See Choudhry & Fenwick,
[351.
at
113 Payne, [20011 EWCA (Civ) 166
114 Id.
115 Id.
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fragmented family memprioritizes the child's welfare in adjudicating
116
bers' rights.
distinction between fragArticle 8, however, makes no such
Article 8 leaves no void for English
mented and traditional families.
families-it applies equally to
law to fill in cases involving fragmented
to children's best interall family members, without any preference
has interpreted a parent's or
ests. Furthermore, the European Court
as constituting the fundamental
grandparent's access to his children 1 1 7
Permanently depriving a
element to the protection of family.
compelling reasons is subject 11to8
father of access to his child without
Court of Human Rights.
strict scrutiny according to the European
8 as excluding fragmented famThus, Payne's interpretation of Article
ily members is pure legal fiction.
refused to compromise English
Finally, the Payne court blatantly
8 when the father challenged
precedent that conflicted with Article
19
case Poel v. Poe, which formuthe result stemming from the English
to emigrate with a child when realated a test permitting one parent
test would not satisfy the
sonable.1 20 Although a reasonableness
parent of
scrutiny for cases that deprive one
European Court's strict
121 the Payne court diverged even further from
access to his child,
the fundamental question in the
European case law by stating that
1 22 The judge
of the child.
case actually regarded the best interests
benefit the child and, "[i] t is
concluded that a happy mother would
off to a large extent-almost
true that it means cutting the child
but that is one of the risks which
wholly perhaps-from the father; 12 3
this kind.
have to be run in cases of
quotation of European
Thus, Paynes selective and misleading
of any conflict between Article 8
law, in addition to its blatant denial
courts' resistance to Article 8
and English law, underscores English
any potential conflict with
and illustrates their methods of avoiding
the welfare principle.
rights to
member of the fractured family has
116 The court opined that "each
of the
paramountcy
the
to
court must adhere
assert and that in balancing them the
welfare principle." Id. at [37].
note 74.
117 See supra text accompanying
text.
accompanying
and
118 See supra notes 81-86
119 [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1469 (C.A.).
120
121
122
123
L.R.

Id. at 1473-74.
text.
See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying
166, [2001] Fam. 473, [16], [39].
Payne v. Payne, [2001] EWCA (Civ)
1 Fam.
Removal from Jurisdiction), [1980]
Id. at [18] (quoting A v. A (Child:
380, 381-82 (C.A. 1979)).
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LESSONS FROM ENGLAND

of the welfare principle for
Having abided by the paramountcy
years have English courts faced
centuries, only within the last ten
rights from across the Channel.
adults armed with explicit individual
of English courts to forced
It is unsurprising, then, that the reaction
been peppered with resistance.
prioritization of adult rights has
adults' rights and chilThe development of the conflict between
paralleled the problems resulting
dren's best interests in England has
law in the United States as the
from the federalization of family
to abortion, adoption, and child
Supreme Court opened its docket
illustrate, Americans may rely on
custody issues. As Troxel and Palmore
arguments to curtail the reach of
due process and equal protection
before the best interests stanthe best interests standard. However,
a formerly state-controlled issue,
dard becomes a vestigial organ of
ominous warnings for the AmeriEngland's experience offers several
can family law system.
American Family Law
The Case Against the Federalizationof
from the friction between
Perhaps the most significant lesson
law warns against American federEnglish domestic law and European
in regards to cases involving chilalization of family law, particularly
standard be weakened, but
dren. Not only would the best interests
to resist prioritizing
states may also exhibit England's determination
adults' rights.
similarities between the trends
This possibility exists because the
such an analogy: A mandatory
on both sides of the Atlantic permit
for the lower courts to ensure that
legal system is setting precedence
Although England's legal sysadults' rights be taken more seriously.
welfare, European law has unsuctem has always prioritized children's
the importance of the welfare
cessfully attempted to diminish
of
it to a mere factor in the balance
principle in England by reducing
to
attempts
law
American federal
family members' rights. Similarly,
the
the state level, thus recreating
dilute the best interests standard on
family law.
effect of European law on English
Rights is sympathetic to
Just as the European Court of Human
theoretically accepts the princichildren's rights, the Supreme Court
in cases involving childrenple on which state family law operates
be prioritized. In practice, howthat the children's welfare should
entertaining and occasionally
ever, the Supreme Court cannot resist
regarding adults' rights in cases
legitimizing constitutional arguments
interests standard. By doing so, the
of conflict with the children's best
A.
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states' best interests standard has been compromised by federal law, as
it has been in England by European law.
In addition to weakening the best interests standard, federal law
strengthening adults' constitutional rights under the guise of due process and equal protection will probably encounter resistance from
lower courts. While states are bound by adults' constitutional rights,
as England is bound by Article 8 of the European Convention, they
are likely to follow England's path of resistance. Following the
Supreme Court decision in Troxel, for example, the states scrambled
to reformulate grandparents' visitation statutes to protect the best
interests of children when such interests depended on access to
grandparents. 12 4 New Jersey was representative of other states when
its Supreme Court continued to uphold grandparent visitation by
altering the original statute slightly:
We hold that grandparents seeking visitation under the statute must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that denial of the visitation they seek would result in harm to the child. That burden is
constitutionally required to safeguard the due process rights of fit
parents. Finally, we hold that, in this case, the grandparents have
2
met that burden.1 5
The court then granted visitation to the grandparents post- Troxel, who
were very involved in the children's lives before the dispute arose.
These facts could not be distinguished enough from Troxel to suggest
that the states were significantly impacted by the Supreme Court
case.

126

Thus, if England is to serve as a guide, the American Supreme
Court should be wary of federalizing family law regarding children,
particularly when doing so implicates the best interests standard.
B. Equal Treatment of Adults and Children Under the Constitution
In the United States, it is not uncommon to argue that children's
constitutional rights may sufficiently protect their interests.12 7 In
124 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-306 (West 2005); UTAH CODE ANN § 30-5-2
(West Supp. 2006).
125 Moriarty v. Bradt, 827 A.2d 203, 205 (N.J. 2003).
126 Both cases involved a couple with two children, whose relationships with their
grandparents were compromised by one parent's death. The remaining parent had
developed a hostile relationship with the grandparents, causing the severance of the
grandparents' intimate relationship with the children despite the best interests standard, which indicated that maintaining the relationship would be beneficial. Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60-63 (2000) (plurality opinion); Moriarty, 827 A.2d at 203.
127 See, e.g., Sec'y of Pub. Welfare of Pa. v. InstitutionalizedJuveniles, 442 U.S. 640,
652 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Pennsylvania
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Troxel, Justice Scalia suggested a potential First Amendment right of
association or free exercise on behalf of the children, allowing them
to visit with their grandparents against the mother's wishes. 128 In
another Supreme Court case, it was argued on behalf of a child, albeit
unsuccessfully, that a restriction on her right to access a presumed
29
parent violated both her due process and equal protection rights.1
However, granting children constitutional fights equivalent to
those of adults in order to protect their interests in lieu of the best
interests standard is ineffective. Families finding themselves in court
are already fragmented-treating each member equally under the
Constitution is slow to resolve any issues, let alone to result in ajudgment favorable to the child's best interests. This observation emerges
as the primary lesson from the European Court of Human Rights,
which frequently finds against children's traditional best interests by
endowing them with rights equal to those of adults under Article 8.
England, on the contrary, has always decided in the best interests of
the children by virtue of having separate legislation protecting them,
which forces the courts to consider the children first in adjudicating
family law cases.
As Lord Oliver of Aylmerton observed in the English case In re
KD., rarely does adjudicating an adult's rights have a neutral effect on
the child:
My Lords, if it is possible to envisage a case in the real world in
which there is such a perfect equilibrium that the effect of access by
a parent on a child of full mental capacity and in a normal state of
health can be truly said to be absolutely neutral, I can see an argument for saying that the natural bond between parent and child
may dictate a resumption or continuation of access. But that is not,

must assign each institutionalized child a representative obliged to initiate contact
with the child and ensure that the child's constitutional rights are fully protected.
Otherwise, it is inevitable that the children's due process rights will be lost through
inadvertence, inaction, or incapacity.").
128 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 93 n.2 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). But see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 591 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Even with respect to the First Amendment, the
rights of children have not been regarded as 'co-extensive with those of adults.'"
(quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969)

(Stewart, J., concurring))).
129 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130-32 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(rejecting the argument that a child's liberty interest in maintaining a filial relationship with her natural father and her equal protection right to rebut the presumption

of her legitimacy were violated by the lower courts).
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case that I can reasonably
in my judgment, this case nor is it any
0
envisage.'
indeed impacts a child's best
If, then, adjudicating an adult's rights
be afforded extra protection in
interests, those best interests must
in a jurisdiction that adheres
determining the adult's rights-at least
the United States. Without this
to the welfare principle, such as
children's interests become
added protection of the welfare principle,
that will likely fail to protect the
just one factor in a balancing act
child.
and children in the United
Thus, granting equal rights to adults
standard and lead to the
States would weaken the best interests
legal system after the adoption
problems encountered by the English
is any attachment to the welfare
of the Human Rights Act. If there
specially be protected in separate
principle in a society, children must
by strict faithfulness to the best
legislation on the state level, or at least
interests standard.
CONCLUSION

adults' rights and children's
While the familiar conflict between
in the United States on the
best interests has slowly been intensifying
law, it has recently exploded in
heels of the federalization of family
conflicting legislation. The adult
England following the passage of
Convention on Human Rights were
rights enshrined in the European
English judges when children's
immediately met with reluctance from
Children Act of 1989, were
best interests, prioritized by the
continued to exhibit fierce loythreatened. The English courts have
either by denying any conflict
alty to the children's welfare principle,
the Convention by which they
with European law or mischaracterizing
with the visibility of the advanare bound. This resistance, coupled
experience, offers several lessons
tages and disadvantages of England's
for the United States.
that federal courts should
Most importantly, this Note has argued
constitutional relief for adults in
be wary of granting and expanding
best interests standard comprochild-related cases. Not only is the
for the standard will doubtfully
mised by this, but states' enthusiasm
be cautious in relying on the
wane. Furthermore, the courts should
which would be analogous
Constitution to protect children's interests,
of adults under Article 8
to treating children as the legal equivalents
of the European Court have
of the European Convention. Judgments
806, 820
Termination of Access), [19881 A.C.
130 In re KD. (A Minor) (Ward:
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
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greatly differed from those of English and American courts because of
the European Court's inability to openly favor children's interests
without the aid of explicit support from the Convention. Therefore, if
the states remain committed to the best interests of the child, then the
most effective way to achieve protection of those interests is to explicitly accept the paramountcy of the standard. Moreover, federal courts
must not counter this effort by constitutionalizing child-related family
law. Fortunately, before federal courts continue dipping their proverbial feet into the choppy waters of family law, lessons from across the
pond can help prevent a hurricane in the field of American family
law.

